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Abstract
A reduction of impediments to international flows of goods,
capital and professional labor is thought to raise the economic costs of
programs by the nation state (and labor unions) to redistribute income
to the poor and to provide economic security. But some of the more
politically and economically successful examples of such policies -for example Nordic social democracy and East Asian land reform-have occurred in small open economies which would, on the above
account, provide a prohibitive environment for egalitarian
interventions. I present a model of globalization and redistribution to
answer the following question: in a liberalized world economy, what
programs of egalitarian redistribution and social insurance are
implementable by democratic nation states acting independently?
While in the absence of international coordination, globalization indeed makes it difficult for nation states to affect the relative
(after tax) prices of mobile goods and factors of production and for
this and other reasons may limit the effectiveness of some conventional
strategies of redistribution, a large class of state and trade union
interventions leading to substantial improvements in the wages,
employment prospects, and economic security of workers is not ruled
out by globalization. Included are redistributions of assets which
provide efficient solutions to incentive problems arising in principal
agent relationships such as wage employment, farm and residential
tenancy.

1. Introduction
For well-known reasons, a reduction of impediments to international flows of
goods, and factors of production -- commonly termed globalization -- may enhance
allocative efficiency both globally and within national economies, and the associated
competition among nation states may contribute to governmental accountability. 1
However, globalization is also thought to raise the economic costs of programs by the
nation state to redistribute income to the poor and to provide economic security for
their populations. Among the reasons is the fact that the more internationally mobile
factors of production -- capital and professional labor -- tend to be owned by the rich,
and a nation-specific tax on a mobile factor induces national-output-reducing
relocations of these factors. Similar reasoning demonstrates the high cost of attempting
to alter the relative prices of factors of production, for example, by raising the wage
relative to the return to capital through trade union bargaining. Even Pareto-improving
insurance-based policies are compromised, as cross-border mobility of citizens allow
the lucky to escape the tax costs of supporting the unlucky, thereby reintroducing the
problem of adverse selection plaguing private insurance and which public insurance
was thought to avoid (Sinn, 1997).
The result is a generalization of what Arthur Okun (1975) called redistribution
in leaky buckets: the net benefit to the recipient may fall considerably short of the loss
to those paying the costs. In a democracy, leaky buckets thus make it more difficult to
secure governmental support for egalitarian redistribution, and thus compromise both
the ethical appeal and the political viability of redistributive programs. By
exacerbating the generalized leaky bucket problem, trade liberalization and other
aspects of globalization are thus thought to restrict the range of redistributive policy
which is politically sustainable in democratic nation states.2
Thanks for research assistance by Bridget Longridge, Yongjin Park, and Lawrance
Evans helpful contributions from Pranab Bardhan, Daniel Bromley, Helena De
Letourdis, Steven Durlauf, Maurizio Franzini, Ugo Pagano, Fabio Petri, Eric
Verhoogen, and Elisabeth Wood, and to the MacArthur Foundation for financial
support.
1

Globalization can work powerfully to reduce inequalities, both between countries,
and even within, where it may induce more competitive product markets (reducing the
discrepancy between prices and marginal costs and thus raising real wages) and
providing greater accountability for state and para statal institutions often dominated
by elites. It is in part for these reasons that center left parties such as the African
National Congress in South Africa and the former Communist Party in Italy have
supported trade liberalization. On the basis of available data, however, one cannot
conclude that either recent or long term globalization tendencies have on balance
2
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But some of the more politically and economically successful redistributive
policies -- for example Nordic social democracy and East Asian land reform-- have
been implemented in small open economies which would, on the above account, seem
to provide a prohibitive environment for egalitarian interventions (Moene (1998),
Huber and Stephens (1998), Moene and Wallerstein (1993) Yang (1970), Putzel (nd),
and Yager (1980) ). Other cases of open-economy egalitarianism include the Costa
Rican welfare state (Mesa-Lago, (1989), Rosenberg (1981) Yashar (1995)),
egalitarian distribution of health services and nutrition in Sri Lanka (Anand and
Kanbur (1991), Isenman (1980)) and wage compression in Singapore(Lim, (1984))
and the public health policies and dramatic reduction in infant mortality under the
socialist government of the Seychelles Republic (Republic of Seychelles, (1999).3
Particularly striking are the cases of two Indian states, Kerala and West
Bengal. Goods and factors of production move freely across their boundaries, and
their state governments have limited control over the legal and fiscal environment of
their state economies. But investments in health, schooling and other human capacities
in Kerala and land tenure reform in both states (especially West Bengal), have
substantially redistributed income and improved the well-being of the poor
(Ramachandran (1996), Sengupta and Gazdar (1996), Banerjee and Ghatak (1996)
Besley and Burgess (1998)). The leftist governments credited with these policies
have been repeatedly returned to office in democratic elections.
As even this brief description of cases of relatively successful egalitarian
redistribution suggests, the reasons for the policies, as well as their design and the
mechanisms by which they worked have differed substantially. Some owe their
existence to electoral competition in polities with substantial majorities of poor
voters; others have been implemented to forestall populist political successes. Each
case exhibits serious shortcomings; but I will not dwell on these as my point is not to
elevate them as models but rather is more modest: unless the cases are entirely
idiosyncratic they suggest that the commonplace opposition between globalization and
egalitarianism may be overdrawn.
In the pages which follow I present a model of globalization and redistribution
seeking to answer the following question: in a globalized world economy, what
programs of egalitarian redistribution and social insurance are implementable by
democratic national states acting independently? A program is implementable if its

favored greater equality in world income. The period of increased liberalization from
1988-1993, for example was marked by a substantial increase in world inequality
(Milanovic, 1999). See also Zimmerman (1962) and Schultz (1998).
The nature of the openness which characterizes these cases differs of course; all
have relatively large trade flows while some have (or had) relatively restricted capital
flows.
3
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desired outcome is a stable Nash equilibrium of the appropriately defined game.4 An
implementable program must therefore be economically and politically sustainable:
not susceptible to being undone either by the electorate or by private exchange.5
My response, drawing on recent work of many authors, is that in the absence
of international coordination, globalization indeed makes it difficult for national states
to affect the relative (after tax) prices of mobile goods and factors of production, and
for this and other reasons may limit the effectiveness of some conventional strategies
of redistribution. But globalization does not rule out all egalitarian interventions.
There remains a large class of governmental and other collective interventions
leading to substantial improvements in the wages, employment prospects, and
economic security of the less well off. Included are redistributions of assets which are
productivity enhancing, namely those which provide efficient solutions to incentive
problems arising in principal agent relationships such as wage employment, farm and
residential tenancy, and the provision of environmental and social public goods in
local commons situations.6
Because the model I present depicts a deliberately exaggerated version of
global openness, a caveat on empirical realism is necessary. A number of empirical
studies beginning with Gordon (1988) have stressed the while cross-border flows
have increased in recent years, by these measures the degree of both trade and
investment openness is quite limited in recent decades compared to a century earlier.7
The measure of globalization crucial to the above argument, however, refers not to the
aggregate quantities on which these studies focus, but to microeconomic responses.
The relevant indices should measure the impact of globalization on the elasticity of
demand for labor with respect to the real wage (openness possibly raising the
employment costs of wage increases) as well as the possibly heightened
responsiveness of national investment to own-country wage levels and tax rates

More stringent requirements might be imposed, namely that the changes needed
to enact the transition from the status quo to the desired program (not just be program
itself) be implementable, or that the underlying preferences be stationary. I do not
explore these problems here.
4

The cases of open economy egalitarianism cited above fail to meet some criteria
of democracy over the relevant years (especially alternation of parties in power for
South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) but none were outright dictatorships and most
were exemplary democracies. Przeworksi, et al. (2000).
5

A review of these cases is provided in Bardhan, Bowles, and Gintis (2000).
Asset based redistribution is also stressed in Birdsall and Londono (1997). Atkinson
(1999) and Franzini and Milone (1999) likewise view the constraints thought to be
posed by globalization as exaggerated.
6
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See also Taylor (1999), Glyn and Sutcliffe (1999) and the works cited there.
4

relative to the rest of the world. There is little hard evidence that by these
microeconomic measures openness has increased in recent years, but it seems
plausible to think that it has, or at least will.8 In any case given the widespread view
that these aspects of globalization will thwart attempts at egalitarian redistribution, it
is worth finding out if this is indeed the case, under admittedly extreme globalization
assumptions. Whether the model illuminates real (if very long term) tendencies
operating in the world, or alternatively is a more hypothetical exercise (how the world
would work if it were like that) cannot be determined on the basis of existing
empirical information.
In the next section I present a highly abstract model of a national economy
embedded in a globally competitive environment. The subsequent section addresses
a range of conventional state and trade union policy measures. I then turn to asset
redistributions before concluding with a discussion of policies and institutions.
2. Globalization
The model presented below seeks to illuminate the opportunities for
egalitarian redistribution in a national economy integrated into a world economy
characterized by minimal impediments to capital mobility among nations. To focus on
the contribution of globalization per se to the leaky bucket problem (and because the
problems constituted by corruption and other forms of governmental malfeasance and
unaccountability are well known) I will assume that governments are not self-serving
leviathans (as in the public choice literature) but rather seek to improve the living
standards of the less well off.
Redistribution takes the form of increases in the living standards of a
homogeneous class of workers, either by raising their income or improving their
prospects of being employed. Its focus is not on inequality per se but on labor market
outcomes affecting two important aspects of workers’ well-being, jobs and pay. It
abstracts from differences among workers, and much else of importance, but seeks to
explore the ramifications of two important empirical regularities. The first is that
investment relocates globally in response to differences in expected after-tax profit
rates, and the second is that under a wide range of institutional conditions real wages

Slaughter's (1999) estimate of an impact of openness on the wage elasticity of
demand in the U.S. economy cannot be distinguished from a time trend, and the same
is true of Heintz and my estimates showing a secular increase in the elasticity of
demand for labor in South Africa (1997). Gordon et al (1998) found some evidence
of a substantial negative "rest of the world profit rate" effect on U.S. investment, but
while Koechlin (1992) also found a statistically significant negative effect of other
countries profit rates on domestic investment in the U.S. this was true in none of the
six other countries for which he estimated investment functions. Epstein (1996) found
little evidence of convergence of profit rates among nations.
8
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covary with the level of employment. 9
The basic assumptions of the model follow. All markets are perfectly
competitive, but labor (which is homogeneous within countries) is not mobile between
countries. The global economy is thus modeled as if it were a national economy with
a single capital market but segmented labor markets; the difference, of course, is that
each labor market segment is represented by an autonomous government. There is a
single good which is both consumed and used as capital (corn is eaten and planted as
seed). At the end of each period, after the payment of wages, wealth holders (those
who own the corn surplus, if it exists) may either consume corn or allocate it as an
investment good among many national economies in response to national differences
in expected after-tax profit rates.
Actors differ by wealth level: the wealthy are risk neutral while those without
assets (workers, employed and unemployed) are risk averse. Neither work effort nor
the promise to repay a loan is contractible, so the relations between employers and
workers and between lenders and borrowers are principal-agent relationships.
Employers use monitoring and the threat of dismissal to induce workers to provide
satisfactory levels of effort. For this reason (and perhaps others), the equilibrium of
the labor market in each national economy is characterized by involuntary
unemployment. Thus labor suppliers are quantity constrained in labor markets. Lacking
wealth they are unable provide collateral or other means of attenuating the
incompleteness of the credit contract, they are also quantity constrained in credit
markets.
The competitive equilibria of this model for the single global markets in
capital goods (corn) and credit support a common rate of expected profit and rate of
time preference globally (and hence the risk-free interest rate). By contrast, nationspecific institutions and cultures concerning labor relations, government policies and
security of property rights give rise to national differences in equilibrium wages and
employment. There are thus n+1 prices in this model: each of n nations’ real wage
(price of an hour of labor relative to the price of corn) and the global risk free interest
rate (price of goods now relative to goods later). As I will investigate just a single
national economy, I will not give national subscripts to the relevant variables.
Because firms use a single production function and are otherwise identical, we
can analyze production and wage setting as if it took place in a single (competitive)
firm. Aggregate output, Q, is simply total labor effort times average output per unit of
Econometric evidence of profit-led investment is presented in Catinat (1988),
Clark (1979), Kopcke (1985), Feldstein (1982), Bashkar and Glyn (1995), Boyer and
Bowles (1995), Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf (1989), Gordon, Weisskopf and
Bowles (1998) and the works cited there. Evidence concerning the covariation of real
wages and employment is found in Bowles (1991) and Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994).
9
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effort, y, with a fixed capital (seed) requirement k per hour of labor. Total effort is the
average effort level per hour, e, of those employees (the directly productive workers)
not engaged in monitoring multiplied by their hours of work, h(1-m) where h is the
total (productive and monitoring) hours of work and m is the fraction of total work
time accounted for by the monitors. So
(1)

Q = yeh(1-m) for K $ kh(1-m)
= 0 for K < kh(1-m)

I normalize national labor supply at unity (given exogenously); so h , [0,1] is
the level of employment. Effort is determined by workers in response to the incentives
and sanctions devised by the employer. As these include monitoring and the threat of
job termination, the worker's optimal effort choice varies inversely with his or her
fallback position, namely expected utility if employment is terminated which depends
on the expected duration of a spell of unemployment and the level of support
conditional on being unemployed, b. Suppose effort may be either 1 (imposing a
disutility of a on the worker) or 0, and that the probability of termination if e=0 is J.
Then, with suitable simplifying assumptions, the wage that will just induce workers
to choose e=1 equates the expected utility of the two effort choices, which gives
(2)

w* = a/J(1-h) + b

as the "no shirking wage."10 Of course J and a depend on the institutional structure
governing labor relations (the costs to the employer of firing a non-working employee,
the perceived fairness of the wage determination process, the degree of effectiveness
of the monitoring system, and the like). Along with e=1 which it insures, (2)
implements both the firms' and the employees' first-order conditions, describing the
feasible combinations of w, h, and total effort supplied to firms; it is thus the labor
supply equilibrium condition. The model underlying equation (2) is quite particular,
but it gives a convenient analytical form to the much more general empirical regularity
A bare bones model is this. Workers commit to a level of effort at the beginning
of each period at which point with some probability they will be monitored and
detected if they are shirking. The utility of providing effort is just u(w)-a while for
providing none is (1-J)u(w) + J[(1-h)u(b) + hu(w))] where the second term gives the
consequences of termination, namely a probability (1-h) of remaining unemployed and
receiving b, and a probability (h) of finding work at the going wage. The assumption
that those who are terminated and then find work will not be monitored again until the
beginning of the next period allows a particularly simple no-shirking condition: u(w)
- u(b) = a/J(1-h). See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bowles (1985); Bowles (1991)
provides empirical estimates of the resulting wage function. The equation in the text
lets u(w) = w and u(b) = b, thus abstracting from workers' risk aversion. Endogenizing
the employers' choice of the desired effort level and monitoring intensity would
complicate the model but not alter the results.
10
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mentioned earlier, namely wh > 0, the covariation of wages and the employment
level.11 (For simplicity I assume monitors are paid the same wage as other employees
and I do not address the problem of their incentives to work.) It will be important later
to note that because employees do not shirk, they are not fired, and so bear no risk.
There is therefore a group of 1-h permanently unemployed.
Labor demand (and hence the level of unemployment) depends on the
allocation of the global capital stock among national economies in response to
differences in the expected after-tax profit rate. Recalling that the capital good is an
intermediate input, the profit rate before tax is just
r = {(y-k)h(1-m)-wh}'kh(1-m)
or expressed in per hour of employment (by eliminating h) the profit rate is net output
per hour of labor minus the wage rate, divided by the capital input required to employ
an hour of labor. Suppose that to finance its activities the national government levies
a linear tax, t, on profits so the after tax profit rate is
B = r(1-t) = (1-t)[(y-k)(1-m)-w]'[k(1-m)]

(3)

Wealth holders finance a project if its expected return exceeds their rate of
time preference, which I will assume is globally equal to the return on some risk-free
instrument, D. Projects are exposed to a risk of “confiscation” or other unexpected
reduction in their value, the probability of which, c 0 [0,1], varies among countries,
reflecting national differences in macroeconomic policy, political stability,
criminality, and the like.(In a less abstract model with distinct national currencies, risk
includes adverse changes in foreign exchange rates.) Suppose the return is zero in
the period of the confiscation: wages are paid but the expected costs of contestation
occasioned by the confiscation exactly exhaust the profits. The expected profit rate is
thus B
^ = B(1-c). Writing the insecurity premium, µ=1/(1-c), the national economy's
level of corn investment is stationary if expected after-tax profit rates are equated
across nations and are jointly equal to the risk-free interest rate (B
^ =D) or:
B=Dµ

(4)

Because r is monotonically declining in w, there is just one wage rate which will
satisfy (4); using (3) to rewrite (4) we find that this wage w is given by
(5)

w = (1-m)[y-k(1+Dµ)'(1-t)]

An alternative formulation yielding similar qualitative results would make the
wage level and effort level the outcome of a collective bargaining process, with the
(Nash) bargain struck depending on the fallback position of the two parties, and
labor's fallback rising with h.
11
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When (5) obtains, the level of the capital stock, and hence employment is stationary;
it is the equilibrium labor demand equation (conditional on e=1).12
w*(h)
w

w

h
h*
Figure 1: Equilibrium Employment and Wages.

Because w*(h) is monotonic, there is just one h consistent with w. The general
equilibrium of the national economy (taking D as exogenous) is defined by
(6)

w*=w,

satisfying the condition for stationarity of both the employment rate and the wage
rate.13 Their determination may be described as follows: the nation's specific
institutions which influence the net after tax productivity of labor and the risk premium
determine the national wage rate consistent with optimizing by the owners of mobile
investment resources, and the nation's institutions concerning labor markets and work
organization determine what national level of aggregate employment makes that wage
consistent with individual optimizing by firms and workers. Figure 1 illustrates the
equilibrium of this model for a given national economy. (Notice that for any wage less
Nothing of substance depends on the assumption that k is exogenous. If firms
using a production function with the conventional properties chose an optimal level
of k depending on the wage rate so that k=k(w) with k'>0 and y=y(k) with yk>0 the
unique wage rate consistent with world capital market equilibrium (and independent
of h) would exit as in (5) but with the production technology endogenous; (5) would
represent the wage satisfying both the firm's first order conditions for the choice of
inputs and the global capital market equilibrium consistent with those inputs. Thus
making the dependence of y and k on w explicit does not alter the fact that there exists
just one national wage rate consistent with equalized expected wage rates among
nations. The invariance of w with respect to h results not from exogeneity of k but from
the assumption that there are constant returns to scale at the national level and no
factors are in fixed supply.
12

The equilibrium exists as long as w*(0;b)<w<w*(1;b). The equilibrium is stable
and unique under current assumptions, but as we will see presently, need not be.
13
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than w*, e=0, so dh/dt<0 for w<w* or w>w.)
Finally, the global supply and demand for corn as an investment good together
with the above conditions determine the risk-free interest rate, D. Suppose that in every
country, production takes place according to the nationally specific versions of (6)
and at the end of each period there exists a corn surplus, a given fraction of which is
consumed by the wealthy, the remaining fraction, N, being allocated to investment
among national economies.14 As capital (unlike labor) is not nationally specific, I
assume N is common across countries. At the end of each period, the corn output net
of wages per unit invested is [B(1-c) + 1] and N of this is supplied to the global stock
of corn capital in the next period (by contrast, the supply of investment goods
available in the country is infinitely elastic at the rate D). Call the amount (B(1-c) -1)N
the corn surplus. Because in equilibrium B(1-c) = D in every country each country
supplies an amount to next year’s global capital stock equal to [D + 1]N for every unit
of the current period’s stock. The rate of growth of the world capital stock is thus
(D+1)N -1 or DN - (1-N).
The equilibrium global demand for investment goods is just the amount of corn
necessary to provide the capital goods required by the employment the fraction of each
country's the labor force consistent with the zero profit condition (i.e. that given by
(6).) Thus market clearing (and stationarity of D) requires that the global corn surplus
(the global supply of capital goods) grow at the same rate as the world labor supply,
<. The D which equates the growth rates of capital goods supply and labor supply is
given by
< = DN - (1-N), or
(7)

D = (< + 1)/N - 1.

Countries with slower labor force growth will be permanent exporters of corn-capital
and conversely. This is because excess supply of investment goods per unit of the
current period capital stock (in a given country whose labor force is growing at the
rate 0) is
(8)

) = N(B(1-c) + 1) - (1+0)

The first term in is the corn surplus available for investment per unit of the current
period capital stock and the second is the increase in the capital stock required to
sustain the equilibrium level of employment. Using (7) and the fact that B(1-c) = D we
The invariance of N with respect to D may be motivated in a number of ways, for
example it results from an inter-temporal utility function of the wealthy of the form u
= ux1-NgN where x is this period's consumption and g is a bequest to the next generation
equal to the returns on the invested corn, given next period. Nothing of substance
would be altered if D and the investment share of the surplus were jointly determined.
14
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can see from (8) that ) = < - 0. An implication is that when national labor forces all
grow at the global average, in equilibrium all investment is domestically financed.15

D

D = (1+<)'N -1

H(D)
H
H*

H

Figure 2: World Labor Demand

To analyze the determination of global employment, notice that a common
global D implies country specific wi(D)'s for each of the n national economies; given
nation specific hi(w)'s the hi's are determined as well. So we may define global employment, H(D), as the horizontal summation of the implied hi(D) functions, giving
H(D), with H'<0, where the variation in world employment is simply that generated
by varying D given the equilibrium condition (6). Figure 2 illustrates the determination
of global employment. In the following analysis of a single national economy I treat
D as exogenous.
3. Increasing Wages and Employment
Where, as in Figure 1, the equilibrium is unique and stable, the effect of
country-specific policy interventions may be studied (as I will do presently) by a
comparative static analysis of the displacement of the exogenous terms in w*(h) and
w. But the more complicated case of multiple equilibria (some of them unstable)
cannot be ruled out. To see this, suppose that the confiscation probability c varies
inversely with h -- high levels of unemployment supporting a populist or criminal
environment, for example -- so µ=µ(h) with µ'<0. Then w is increasing in h, which
(because w* is also increasing in h) means that there may exist many values of h
equating the two.16
Note that in this "hyper-globalized" economy, there are no investment or trade
flows in equilibrium, underlining the importance of distinguishing between aggregate
flow-based and microeconomic response-based measures of openness.
15

I here provide no reason to expect multiple equilibria -- they are not difficult to
imagine -- but simply note that their possibility may help explain the pattern of
divergence among apparently similar national economies ((Nigeria’s per capita
16
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w*(h)
w

w

h*
h”
h’
Figure 3: Multiple Equilibria (endogenous risk)

h

Figure 3 illustrates an upward -rising equilibrium labor demand function, with
the labor market equilibria a exhibiting the vicious circle of low employment, low
wages, and high insecurity premium ("Nigeria") and a' exhibiting the virtuous converse
("Taiwan"). The possibility of multiple stable equilibria enriches the policy analysis
considerably, as it allows small one-time interventions to have permanent, nonmarginal effects, and it provides a framework for analyzing possible divergent growth
paths ("high road" vs "low road" wage strategies, for example.) A one-time demand
expansion, for example, pushing the employment level above the critical value o h”
in figure 3 could permanently shift the equilibrium from the low wage/high insecurity
poverty trap to its virtuous converse.
The impact of strategies to raise wages and employment may now be assessed
through their curve-shifting effects in figures 1 or 3. For example, enhanced security
of property rights by reducing c (for any level of h) lowers µ, hence raises w, and
increases both h* and w* (from figure 3, it can be seen that the implied upward shift
in w(h) might also eliminate the "low road" equilibrium, displacing a national
economy previously entrapped there to a rapid transition to the "high road".)
The effects of changes in labor relations and labor market structure are equally
transparent. Efforts to protect workers from dismissal for cause by reducing J through
job protection strategies shift the w*(h) function upwards without affecting w, leaving
the wage rate unaffected but reducing employment. Raising b, the magnitude of
transfers whose availability is conditional on being out of work, has a similar effect,
but unlike a reduction in J, the welfare implications of an increase in b are ambiguous,
as it raises the well-being of the least well off (the jobless), while increasing their
income exceeded that of Taiwan, for example, in 1950 (Summers and Heston
(1984))and more generally what Quah (1996) calls the “twin peaks” pattern of
divergence in income levels among countries.
12

numbers.
Trade unions may increase wages and/or employment in a number of ways,
however (Bowles and Boyer, 1990b). First, unions may draw on workers' private
information concerning the performance of other workers to improve the disciplinary
environment of the workplace (raising J or lowering m). Second "union voice" effects
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984) may raise productivity and reduce the disutility of labor,
(the latter would lower the w(h) function, supporting a higher level of employment).
Third, collective bargaining agreements to provide well-defined job ladders and
security from cyclical job loss provide greater incentives for firm-specific investments
by workers (Pagano (1991)). Both union voice and specific investment effects shift w
upwards and w*(h) to the right. 17 Fourth, negotiated incomes policies may lower or
flatten the w*(h) function. 18 Finally, if w becomes accepted as a fairness norm -perhaps because it is the wage rate that will give the employer a rate of return equal
to what other employers receive, or to the marginal disutility of foregoing current
consumption -- and if, as seems likely, perceived fairness is a determinant of work
effort, the w*(h) function will flatten, thereby increasing the employment gains
associated with upward shifts in w due to productivity gains. Because in equilibrium,
no employee is working harder as a result of any of these changes, and because the
unemployed prefer employment, the welfare gains associated with the implied trade
union induced increases in wages and or employment are unambiguous.
The effects of government expenditures and the efficiency of public service
delivery may be explored in similar fashion . Suppose the productivity of a unit of
effective labor depends on 8p, the effectiveness (8)and level (p) of public expenditure
In a multi-period context, a reduction in the probability of job loss for reasons
other than insufficient effort (protection from cyclical layoffs, for example) reduces
the no-shirking wage because it increases the value of not shirking.
17

Where, as in the Nordic social democratic countries and especially Sweden,
collective bargaining explicitly sought to implement wages consistent with successful
competition in global markets, the w*(h) function came to approximate the w function
itself (the latter defining the target wage in the above bargaining model), with firmand industry-specific wage drift accounting for discrepancies between the two
functions. Perhaps surprisingly, negotiated incomes policies can lower the labor
supply equilibrium condition (for all values of h) even if w*(h) represents a
conventional efficiency wage no shirking condition; for the competitive equilibrium
wage in that case will exceed that which would minimize the cost of an effective unit
of labor if implemented by collusion among employers. The reason (explained in
Bowles and Boyer, 1990a) is that each worker's fallback position includes the
prospect of a job at other employers' wages, so employers face a coordination
problem resulting in their overpaying relative to their joint profit maximum. Thus there
exists a lower wage which colluding employers would prefer, and which might be
implemented through negotiated incomes policies.
18
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on productivity-enhancing complementary inputs (such as nutrition, health care,
schooling and infrastructure) so y = y(8p,..). Assume the government spends all of its
tax revenues on p as well as b, the benefit paid to a worker when unemployed, giving
the budget constraint (expressed as an equality):
(9)

b(1-h) + p = th{[(1-m)y(8p)-k] -w}

From (9) it can be seen that for a given tax rate, there is a level of employment such
that unemployment benefits exhaust the entire budget, and productivity per effective
unit of labor is y = y(0).

w*(h)

w

w(y(p(h)))

w(y(0))
h0

h*

Figure 4: Endogenous Transfers and Public Investment

Above this level of employment, productivity-enhancing public expenditures
increase, which by (5) then require a higher wage to equilibrate the capital market,
yielding the upward rising w function in figure 4. The also upward-rising w*(h)
function (as drawn) intersects the equilibrium labor demand function twice, suggesting
a possible high and low public investment divergence among nations.19 Because for
any level of h, w covaries with 8 and varies inversely with b, and because (as we
have seen) decreasing b also shifts the w*(h) function to the right, it follows that
reallocating expenditure from transfers conditioned on unemployment towards
productivity enhancing public investment and increasing the effectiveness of public
expenditures will simultaneously raise the (stable) equilibrium wage and employment
level.20 It might appear that this change is unambiguously welfare enhancing, but a
There is no "low road" equilibrium in this case, as ho violates (6) while lower
levels of employment violate the budget constraint.
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For a given level of b, 8 and h, there exists a tax rate that maximizes w (and
hence both employment and wages); for obvious reasons it varies inversely with b (if
taxes were spent only on b, the optimal rate would be zero) and covaries with 8 and
20
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more realistic model in which the employed periodically lose their jobs would show
that for sufficiently high levels of risk aversion among workers, the lost insurance
would more than offset the higher expected wage.
Increases in productivity (y), whether due to public expenditure or exogenous
technical change, shift w upward allowing increases in equilibrium employment.
Differentiating (6) we see that the size of this employment effect depends critically on
db/dy, the effect of the change in productivity on the fallback position of employed
workers:
(10)

dh/dy = {(1-m) - db/dy}/wh

which has the same sign as its numerator, as we know that w h > 0.Where productivity
gains are shared with the unemployed through increases in b, and where monitoring
levels are substantial, the upward shift in the equilibrium labor supply condition (2)
may even reverse the potential employment gains. There is thus a policy choice
concerning the manner in which productivity increases should be shared with the
unemployed through expanding the number of jobs on the one hand, or by raising the
average income of those remaining unemployed on the other.
As the examples in this section make clear, opportunities for raising wages
and/or employment arise when allocative inefficiencies can be corrected either at
minimal cost (as when union voice effects may attenuate the misalignment of incentives
arising from the incomplete employment contract) or through expenditures on which
the expected social rate of return exceeds µD (as when credit constraints or other
reasons induce workers to acquire inefficiently little schooling.) The problems of
credit constraints and incomplete contracts may also be addressed more directly by
a redistribution of assets, or more precisely by a redistribution of the rights of residual
claimancy and control commonly bundled with asset ownership, and by extending to
the asset poor the credit market and insurance opportunities of the wealthy.
4. Asset-Based Redistribution
Suppose at the beginning of each period, a national government borrows corn
on the world market at the rate D, in turn lends it to teams of producers at the rate Dµ,
who at the end of the period are equal residual claimants on the income of the team,
after repaying the government an expected amount of 1+D per unit of corn borrowed
(accounting for confiscations occurring as before at the rate c.)21 Assume that these
h (where h is high little tax revenue goes to unemployment benefits and more to
productivity enhancement, so as long as the rate of return of public investment exceeds
D it raises w.)
The simpler case in which individual producers use the corn to produce
independently is transparent, but not empirically relevant where team production is
21
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coops adopt a labor discipline strategy similar to their erstwhile employers
(dismissing non-performing team mates). Coops are therefore constrained to offer
members a level of income equivalent to w*(h), to deter shirking (as we will see
immediately below, because the producers now bear risk, the coop must offer a
certainty equivalent income equal to w*(h).) Work mates have private information on
each others' work activities, and as residual claimants on the income of the team
members are motivated to participate in mutual monitoring, so the monitoring costs of
maintaining work effort will be reduced, to m— < m. 22 As before I assume that the
monitors receive the same hourly payment as the directly productive coop producers.
Finally, let the implicit tax rate on the use of capital remain unchanged.
The co-op’s advantage of reduced monitoring may be more than offset by
suboptimal risk-taking. The reason is that risk-averse members now control the
production process and (relaxing the assumption of given production technologies)
face a choice among production methods of varying risk and expected output. Recall
that as wage employees the producers bore no risk, but as residual claimants they
must, given that the are residual claimants on a stream of output which is subject to
stochastic variation. For concreteness imagine that corn may be planted at various
times, and the expected return and its variance depend on the planting date, with
greater risk covarying with higher expected returns over some range.
Suppose that expected output per hour of effective labor is y(F) where F is the
standard deviation of output and y is increasing and concave in its argument, reaching
a maximum at F*. The risk-neutral employer of course selected F*, so the analysis of
the previous section assumed a level of expected productivity of y= y(F*). Utilitymaximizing risk-averse coop members will select some level of F- < F* and hence
generate a level of expected income y(F-) < y(F*). Coop members are thus residual
claimants on income stream generated by this lesser level of risk taking and , using (5),
have an expected income of
T = (1-m-){y(F) - k(1+Dµ)/(1-t)}

(11)

Of course the expected value of their residual income T(y(F-)) may nonetheless exceed
the w possible under wage employment, depending on the magnitude of the monitoring
savings relative to the reduced expected income occasioned by suboptimal risk taking.
But what matters for them is a comparison of the certain income w in wage
employment with the certainty-equivalent income associated with the coop's risky

required by economies of scale or for other reasons. I assume that there is no rental
market in corn.
Bowles and Gintis, (1999) present a model of this process and point to a
number of empirical cases in which reassigning residual claimancy to members of
even very large teams has substantially increased output per worker hour.
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income stream, namely T(y(F-),F-).23

T(F)
T(F-)
w(F*)

w(F)
F

-

F*

F

Figure 5: Reduced monitoring and suboptimal risk

In order to define the members’ certainty-equivalent income, I assume the
disturbances in the income stream of the coop are such that one can represent the
utility function of the risk-averse members simply as
(12) u = u(T,F)
where T is a "good" and F is a "bad"; Figure 5illustrates two of the implied family of
indifference loci.24 The figure also indicates the capital market clearing wage rate, w
To ensure that the loan is repaid with certainty, I must assume either that in those
presumably rare cases where their realized residual claim is negative (realized gross
income = yr < k(1+Dµ)/(1-t)) coop members have consumption smoothing
opportunities, or that these cases are sufficiently unlikely that they may be ignored.
23

A sufficient assumption is that risk is generated by a linear class of disturbances
which would arise, for example, if the realized output level is defined by yr = Fz +
y(F) where z is a random variable with mean zero and standard deviation unity. This
treatment draws on Bowles and Gintis (1999) and the works by Sinn (1990) and
24
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defined as before by (5), and the expected residual claim of the coop member T(F);
the later, using (5) and (11) is given by
T(F) = w(F)(1-m-)/(1-m)
Risk neutral indifference loci are flat of course, which is why the erstwhile employer
selected F*. The vertical intercept of an indifference locus is the certainty equivalent
of each point making up the locus, so T^(y(F-),F-) for example, is the certainty
equivalent income of the expected income and risk level resulting from the coop's
choice of F-.
For this example, T^(F-) > w(F*)-- producers' certainty equivalent income
would be raised by the formation of coops--and for this reason, coops would
proliferate and wage employment would be eliminated. As Figure 6 shows, the level
of joblessness would fall as a result, though not more than h- producers can belong to
coop work teams as the 1-h- jobless are required to sustain the no-shirking condition
w
T(F-)

w(F*)

h
h*

-

h

Figure 6: Coop income and employment

at the certainty-equivalent income consistent with the stationarity of the country's
capital stock. If, by contrast, T^(F-) < w(F*) of course, producers would not accept
the government loans, and coops would not form.
Suppose, however, that as in figure 5 the coop is advantageous to the
producers; why was the government's intervention required to allow their formation?
The obvious answer -- that the asset-less producers were precluded from borrowing
at economically viable rates of interest -- raises a more difficult question. If, as this
answer implies, the wealth-poor producers’ subjective cost of postponing current
consumption exceeds Dµ, why would they not prefer to use the government loan for
Meyer (1987) cited there.
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consumption purposes? They would; so a successful loan program would have to
embody an enforceable provision restricting the use of the corn to planting rather than
eating. But as we will see, this administrative difficulty is an artifact of the simplicity
of the model.
Gintis and I (1999, Theorems 2 and 3) show that a transfer of an asset (rather
than a loan) mandated by the government may induce the producer to hold the asset
and use it productively even when the transfer of property rights could not have
occurred through private contracting. This implies, of course, that both the ex ante and
the ex post distribution of property rights are Nash equilibria. There are two reasons
why this is possible. Both stem from the fact that the asset transfer alters the
opportunities and constraints of the producer, with the ex post situation supporting use
of the asset by the producer while the ex ante situation is precluding it. First, changing
the wealth status of the producer also changes his or her credit market status (and
hence subjective cost of delaying consumption), increased wealth lowering the
subjective cost of capital. And second, increased wealth may plausibly reduce the
degree of risk aversion, so that while the choice of F by a wealthless producer (say,
renting the asset or using borrowed funds) might have precluded the project being
viable, the (riskier) choice of the same producer with increased wealth (as owner of
the asset) may be viable.25 For this reason a one-time mandated redistribution of
wealth -- making the producers owners and residual claimants -- may be sustainable
in competitive equilibrium and thus have permanent effects.26
Whether the peer-monitoring advantages of the coop will outweigh its risk
avoidance will depend among other things on the policy environment, of course. More
adequate insurance may induce risk-averse producers to choose a higher level of F
(effectively rotating the indifference loci in figure 5 clockwise (Gintis and Bowles
(1999)). Such insurance policies may protect the producer against risk unassociated
with the production process (health insurance, insurance against exogenous variation
on housing wealth) or against those aspects of stochastisticity in the income stream of
the production process which are observable and not affected by the actions of the
producer (for example, macroeconomic stabilization, Shiller (1993)). Because these
insurance policies may be self-financing (fair), the gains to producers constitute
Pareto-improvements and the range of egalitarian redistribution of residual claimancy
and control of assets (through loans or outright transfers) which is consistent with
Evidence for an inverse relationship between wealth and risk aversion is
presented in Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz (1994) and the studies cited there.
25

Technically, the distribution of wealth is governed by a non-ergodic dynamical
process in which initial conditions (or one time exogenous interventions) determine
which of many possible equilibria will obtain. Galor and Zeira (1993) and others have
shown that where credit constraints face the asset poor, and where there is a minimum
economically viable project size (accounting for the necessity of team production in
this case) the wealth distribution process may be non-ergodic.
26
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global competitive equilibrium is expanded.
Egalitarian asset redistribution may have other productivity enhancing effects,
for example, supporting more effective governance institutions in communities, firms,
and the national level, and in promoting a more growth inducing structure of human
capital accumulation. 27
5. Policies
Of course actual governments and trade unions may fail to implement efficient
redistributions for a variety of well known reasons. But on the basis of the above
reasoning, there appears to be ample scope for the implementation of policies capable
of raising wages, employment levels and living standards of the less well off owners
of globally immobile factors of production, even in the empirically unlikely world of
hyper-globalization posited in the model. It seems likely that substantial majorities of
the relevant populations would benefit from these policies, so the policies might be
sustainable in democratic polities.
That these objectives can be furthered by nation states acting singly is
suggested by the dramatic national differences in real wage growth that have been
sustained over long periods. Figure 7 presents data (from Verhoogen 1999) on real
manufacturing wage growth over an 22-year period.28 Even taking account of the

Examples are given in Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Engerman, Sokoloff and
Mariscal(1998), Bowles and Gintis (1998), and Birdsall and Londono (1997)
27

The data (for this figure and the next) are from the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization Industrial Statistics Database. The wage measure is
average annual earnings in manufacturing. The subsequent productivity measure is
value added per employee in manufacturing.
28
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Avg. Growth in Real Annual Earnings in Manufacturing, 1970-1992
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possible importance of productivity catch-up effects (by comparing national
economies initially at the same wage level) one finds extraordinary differences: the
annual rate of change of real wage was 16 percentage points higher in Taiwan and
S.Korea than in Tanzania and 10 percentage points higher in Barbados and Italy, than
in Jamaica and Venezuela. Some of the high wage growth economies have also
experienced very rapid employment growth.
Figure 8 confirms what one would expect -- that wage growth is closely tied
to productivity growth; but even for economies experiencing similar rates of increase
in manufacturing value added per worker, the differences in wage growth are
substantial. Productivity grew in Indonesia grew at the same rate as in Italy, for
example, but wages grew over 5 per cent faster per annum in the latter. While much
of the differences are due to idiosyncratic events and circumstances -- the differing
impacts of the two oil shocks, for example -- national contrasts of this magnitude
suggest that institutional and policy choices do matter, even for small open economies
1972 and which shared broadly similar institutions, experienced far less variability
in subsequent wage growth.)
We know little, it seems, about which institutions and policies account for the
success stories. A common opinion in some policy circles is that strong unions and
substantial redistributive programs are counter-productive in attempting to raise living
standards of the less well off. The reasoning behind this view is that these institutions
favor the egalitarian division the pie, rather than more promising long-term strategies
of rapid growth in investment and average income. Examples confirming this reasoning
are all too easy produce. (this is consistent with the fact that economies in which
wages exceeded $10,000 in1972 and which shared broadly similar institutions,
experienced far less variability in subsequent wage growth.)
We know little, it seems, about which institutions and policies account for the
success stories. A common opinion in some policy circles is that strong unions and
substantial redistributive programs are counter-productive in attempting to raise living
standards of the less well off. The reasoning behind this view is that these institutions
favor the egalitarian division the pie, rather than more promising long-term strategies
of rapid growth in investment and average income. Examples confirming this reasoning
are all too easy produce.

22

0.1
Taiwan

Avg. Growth in Real Annual Earnings in Manufacturing, 1970-1992

0.08
0.06
Italy

Barbados
Malta

Israel
Cyprus
Austria
Finland
Norway
UK
Hong Kong
Iceland
Cent.Afr.Rep.
CameroonNetherlands
W.Germany
GreeceDen.
Trin.&Tob.
Belgium
Pak. Luxembourg
0.02
Malaysia P.N.G.
Egypt
Brazil
Iran
Portugal
Australia
CanadaN.Zeal. Jor.
Philippines Ecuador
S.AfricaUSA SwedenIndonesia
0
Malawi
Turkey
Panama
India Swaziland
Botswana Mauritius
Chile
HondurasGuatemala
Colombia
Fiji
Senegal
-0.02
Bangladesh
Algeria Burundi
0.04

Madagascar

Korea

Japan
Singapore
Ireland
Spain

Kenya
-0.04
Jamaica VenezuelaGhana
-0.06
-0.08

Tanzania

-0.1
-0.08

-0.06

-0.04

-0.02

0

0.02

0.04

Avg. Growth in Real Manufacturing Value Added per Worker, 1970-1992

Figure 8 Rate of Change of Real Wages and Value Added per Worker, 1970-1992

23

0.06

0.08

But this view finds little support in the above data. Indeed a long historical
perspective suggests the opposite: as figure 9 shows, the golden age of the welfare
state and of trade unionism in the advanced economies witnessed by far the most rapid
rates of growth of income per capita and investment in the history of capitalism. 29 In
most countries, the improvement of living standards of the less well off was
correspondingly rapid.
average annual growth rate (percent)
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Figure 9: Growth and Investment, 1820-1979
The model presented here and the empirical evidence suggests three
ways that egalitarian redistribution in open economy settings may have succeeded. The
first is by increasing productivity (or certainty-equivalent income, where risk-bearing
is involved). Examples include the East Asian asset redistributions and the Nordic
(especially Swedish), and Singaporean policy of eliminating wage disparities among
similar workers, thus putting competitive pressure on low productivity firms and
sectors and driving resources into higher productivity uses. The second is improving
the labor discipline environment and thereby reducing monitoring costs and shifting
the equilibrium labor supply condition to the right. Examples include the effect of
wage increases the disutility of effort (through the fair wage effect), trade union and
work team participation in monitoring, and the effect of centralized wage bargaining
The data refer to 13 economies comprising most of world output over the period
covered and are from Glyn et al., (1990) based on Maddison’s (1982) data set. The
measure of capital accumulation is based on the tangible reproducible non-residential
fixed capital stock.
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on flattening the labor supply function. The fact that supervisory labor input is
strikingly lower in countries with more egalitarian earnings distributions (Sweden,
Japan) may reflect these and related effects (Gordon, 1994)
The third strategy is simply to redistribute labor income in a more egalitarian
manner without eroding effort incentives. Suppose, instead of providing income
conditional on unemployment, the government gave all adult members of the
population an unconditional grant $ and financed the grant by a tax on wages
supplemented by the general revenue savings occasioned by setting b=0. Assume the
government sought to do this while maintaining the status quo work incentive situation,
as modeled in Bowles (1993). As b=0 the equilibrium labor supply condition (no
shirking condition) is now
(2')

w* = a/J(1-h)

a flat tax on wage income of b would the restore equilibrium labor supply condition.
As the labor demand equation has not been altered, the employment and (before tax)
wage level would thus remain at the status quo levels. The unconditional grant would
be financed from tax revenues of hb plus savings on the elimination of the previous
transfers of (1-h)b. All adults would thus receive an unconditional grant of $=bh/N
where N is the adult population. The effect would be a redistribution from the
employed and the unemployed to those not in the labor force, obviously favoring the
old, the young, women, and other groups sometimes called "excluded." It might be
thought that the effects of the unconditional grant would be slight because family
structure and other sharing arrangements allow income pooling. But even in the
empirically implausible case that all of the differentially affected groups were paired
in pooling arrangements so that the expected income of each was unaffected by this
policy, dispersion of unconditional income claims to those not in the labor force
would predictably alter the intra-family bargaining power and possibly also the credit
market status of the previously relatively poor and powerless. This appears to be the
case, for example of the quite generous transfers to the elderly in South Africa
(Ardington and Lund (1995)). Of course the grant $ need not take the form of a cash
transfer but could rather be dedicated claims on health, education, recreation, and
other services.
As this last example suggests, in the design and implementation of policies
consistent with the supply side egalitarian approach surveyed here, the heuristic
distinction between the asset redistribution approach of the previous section and the
wage and employment policies of section 3 will lose some of its salience. Where
labor contracts embody both job security and group- or firm-level gain sharing, for
example, employees, may become defacto residual claimants on a substantial fraction
of the income streams they generate. Trade union bargaining can thereby capture some
of the peer monitoring advantages of outright asset distribution to coops. This is
particularly likely to be the case where the monitoring labor effort by outsiders is
ineffective (as in many information based and other service activities), where firm
25

specific human resource investments are important, and where the capital required is
either limited in amount or general (rather than transaction specific) and not subject
to depreciation through misuse. The land tenure reform in West Bengal mentioned at
the outset embodied exactly this logic: the outright transfer of assets to farmers was
precluded by the property clauses in the Indian constitution. Rather, the farmer's share
of the crop was increased from a customary one half to three-quarters, and tenants
were given protection from eviction as long as they granted the landlord the stipulated
reduced share. The result was a substantial increase in the rights of residual claimancy
due not only to the increased share, but also to the reduced threat of eviction and hence
the greater likelihood that the farmer would enjoy the future returns to land
improvements and other investments.
6. Conclusion
Does globalization impede egalitarian redistribution?
What globalization does is to make it quite costly and possibly politically
infeasible to depress the expected after tax rate of return to capital, or to alter the
relative prices of tradeable goods and services. But while globalization – at least in
the hyper form illustrated here – fixes the relative prices of some productive services,
it precludes neither an egalitarian redistribution of the tangible and human assets from
which those services flow, nor the enhancement of the assets currently owned by the
less well off, nor the improvement of the institutionally determined flow of services
from labor assets. Thus, gain-seeking competition does restrict the range of
economically and politically sustainable relative prices, but it does not preclude
egalitarian redistribution. The fundamental theorem of welfare economics defines
conditions under which any technically feasible and Pareto optimal distribution of
welfare can be attained by some redistribution of assets followed by perfectly
competitive exchange. The theorem is not intended as a guide to policy, but it does
underline an important truth: to the extent that globalization heightens competitive
pressures it may reduce the attractiveness of redistributive approaches which rely on
altering relative prices, but this hardly exhausts the set of egalitarian strategies.
An implication of the above is that the traditional vehicles of egalitarian
aspirations -- trade unions and states -- have a different but no less important role to
play in a highly competitive world than in closed economies. The scope for
conventional governmental and trade union measures which reduce the after-tax
expected rate of profit is indeed restricted. But policies to implement Paretoimproving productivity gains may in some respects require a greater rather than lesser
degree of collective interventions in atomistically competitive outcomes. Examples
include an expanded role for publicly-provided insurance to improve the tradeoff
between peer monitoring gains and suboptimal risk-taking losses entailed by more
extensive residual claimancy and control of assets by the non-wealthy, and greater
involvement of collective bargaining in more closely aligning the incentives of
employers and employees with respect to both working and learning on the job.
26

An implication of the above is that the traditional vehicles of egalitarian
aspirations -- trade unions and states -- have no less a role to play in a highly
competitive world than in closed economies. The scope for conventional governmental
and trade union measures which reduce the after-tax expected rate of profit is indeed
restricted. But policies to implement Pareto-improving productivity gains may in some
respects require a greater rather than lesser degree of collective interventions in
atomistically competitive outcomes. Examples include an expanded role for publiclyprovided insurance to improve the tradeoff between peer monitoring gains and
suboptimal risk-taking losses entailed by more extensive residual claimancy and
control of assets by the non-wealthy, and greater involvement of collective bargaining
in more closely aligning the incentives of employers and employees with respect to
both working and learning on the job.
A notable effect of globalization, unremarked thus far, is that (in the extreme
form assumed here) it makes the non-wealthy members of a national population
residual claimants on the results of both their productive efforts and their success in
solving productivity dampening coordination failures. It thus inverts the more common
relationship in which the wealthy are the residual claimants on the income streams
generated by the efforts of the less well off. While in competitive equilibrium the
wealthy cannot get less than D, they also cannot get more, so productivity
improvements are fully captured by the non-wealthy. To the extent that conditions
approximate those assumed in this model, then, the globalization may reduce the
collective action problems confronting would-be coalitions of the non-wealthy seeking
to enhance productivity by attenuating coordination failures.30
The theoretical results presented here, as well as the data in the previous
section, suggest that efforts to raise the living standards of the less well off may
succeed where they attenuate the incentive problems arising when property rights are
ill defined or insecure, contracts are incomplete, and wealth is highly concentrated.
The rationale for the egalitarian supply-side interventions summarized here -- in
contrast to policies restricted to pie-dividing or demand expansion -- is dramatized
by globalization, but it is no less compelling for closed economies.31
The argument is not that the non wealthy have identical interests, but simply that
the difficulty of securing mutually beneficial cooperative solutions with mobile wealth
owners may be circumvented.
30

Abstracting from different national rates of population growth, equilibria of a
closed economy version of this model are identical with the open economy version
(though the out of equilibrium dynamics are quite different and may be critically
important). To see why this is true, consider the supply of investment goods in a
closed economy: the national surplus remaining after the consumption of the wealthy,
in the open economy case, is the contribution of the nation to the global supply of
31
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This is not to say that globalization makes no difference. Even in the very longrun perspective taken here the effect of globalization on the out-of-equilibrium
dynamics may be decisive. A one-time aggregate demand expansion may be crucial,
for example, in permanently displacing an economy from a low road to a high road
equilibrium of the type illustrated in Figure 3, but the effectiveness of the necessary
macroeconomic policies may be reduced by greater openness.

investment goods; in the closed economy case this becomes the supply function for
capital goods in that country (the open economy supply function is infinitely elastic at
the rate D). Thus country-specific supply and demand for corn as an investment good
are as indicated in equation (8) (supply is increasing in D, as expected while demand
is invariant). If 0=< there are no out of equilibrium flows of corn among countries. As
before there is a single interest rate D=(1+<)/N - 1 that clears the market in corn-forinvestment, and (by the zero profit condition) this D determines w and therefore h.
Thus the closed and open economy equilibria are identical. Of course, closed
economies in which populations are growing more rapidly than the world average
support higher equilibrium rates of expected profit and interest and thus experience
lower wages and employment (because this years workers must produce a larger
surplus to employ a constant fraction (h*) of the relatively more numerous workers
of the next period.)
28
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Appendix: The model and notation
Equations
(1)

Q = yhe(1-m) for K $ kh(1-m)

production

= 0 for K < kh(1-m)

capital requirement

(2)

w* = a/J(1-h) + b

labor supply equilibrium cond.

(3)

B = r(1-t) = (1-t)[(y-k)h(1-m)-hw]'[kh(1-m)]

after tax profit rate

(4)

B=Dµ

stationary K

(5)

w = (1-m)[y-k(1+Dµ)'(1-t)]

labor demand equilibrium cond.

(6)

w*=w,

equilibrium in national economy

(7)

D = (< + 1)'N - 1.

global rate of return

(8)

) = N(B(1-c) + 1) - (1+0)

excess national supply of k

)=<-0
(9)

b(1-h) + p = th{[(1-m)y(8p)-k] -w}

government budget constraint

(10)

dh/dy = {(1-m) - db/dy}/wh

employment effects of )productivity

(11)

T = (1-m-){y(F-) - k(1+Dµ)'(1-t)}

exp. residual claim of coop members

(12)

u = u(T,F)

coop members risk averse u()

Notation
y
h
m
k
w*
a
J
b
B
t
µ

output per unit of effort
hours employed (labor demand)
monitoring (fraction of labor time)
capital per hour of productive labor
no shirking wage
disutility of effort
probability of detection (shirker)
terminated workers fallback
after tax profit rate
profits tax rate
risk premium (=1'(1-c))

vii

c
D
N
<
0
8
p
T
F
u

probability of confiscation
risk free interest rate
fraction of corn surplus invested
rate of change of world labor supply
rate of change of nation’s labor supply
effectiveness of public expenditure
level of public investment
expected residual claim (coop)
st.dv. of members’s income stream
coop members utility

